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Abstract. Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferable-
utility, cooperative game, featuring risk averse players. Like in competitive
equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent
claims. And like in ﬁnance, no risk can properly be priced only in terms of its
marginal distribution. Pricing rather depends on the pooled risk and on the
convolution of individual preferences. The paper elaborates on these features,
placing emphasis on the role of prices and incompleteness. Some novelties
come by bringing questions about existence, computation and uniqueness of
solutions to revolve around standard Lagrangian duality. Especially outlined is
how repeated bilateral trade may bring about a price-supported core allocation.
Keywords: cooperative game, transferable utility, core, risks, mutual insurance,
contingent prices, bilateral exchange, supergradients, stochastic approximation.
1. Introduction
In a seminal paper Borch [4] considered risks as commodities and explored whether
such items might be priced merely in terms of their marginal distributions or mo-
ments. Not surprisingly, his ﬁndings were negative. There can hardly exist a linear
pricing regime of that sort. Further, even if existence were granted, price-taking
exchange would not generally yield Pareto eﬃcient allocations. And absent such ef-
ﬁciency, competitive equilibrium cannot obtain. In conclusion, Borch suggested that
risk exchange had better be analyzed as a cooperative game.
This paper follows that suggestion. It extends work of Baton, Lemaire [2] and
adds to Wilson’s theory of syndicates [36]. Upon reconsidering Borch’s approach,
and a pioneering paper by Shapley and Shubik [33], a transferable-utility, cooperative
game comes naturally on stage. It features agents who ﬁnd it worthwhile to pool their
risks [12], [13]. As customary, pooling smoothens nature’s vagaries. Lucky agents can
help unlucky ones; ups somewhere may mitigate downs elsewhere. In eﬀect, when risk
aversion is commonplace, and information is symmetric, the advantages of pooling
suﬃce to render the core non-empty.
Thus, existence of a well deﬁned solution is easily assured. Some queries remain
though. How is risk priced and shared?P u td i ﬀerently: how are premia and policies
determined? Precisely where and how does risk aversion become crucial? What are
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the prospects for eﬃcient computation? Can repeated trade eventually bring about
stable solutions?
The paper addresses all these issues. In doing so, much guidance comes from per-
fect equilibrium in exchange economies. Like there, pricing must be linear, behavior
be price-taking, and any solution a member of the core. Unlike there, our solutions
relate to saddle values instead of ﬁxed points. Such values derive from standard La-
grangian duality. In short, rather than viewing risk exchange as a competitive market
[6], [17], [19], [20], [26], [27], [31], it is seen here as a cooperative game with side pay-
ments [12], [13], [14], [30]. Provided payoﬀs be concave, such games are balanced -i n
fact, totally balanced - hence have nonempty cores [33]. Not surprisingly, risk-sharing
then takes the form of mutual insurance.
Formally, the games at hand ﬁt the frames of optimization and duality methods.
Those frames entail considerable advantages. First, an optimum is usually easier to
locate than a competitive equilibrium. Second, duality facilitates identiﬁcation of
precisely where and how risk aversion aﬀects play. Third, existence and uniqueness
hinge only upon absence of a duality gap and upon diﬀerentiability. Finally, risk trade
can be, and often is, driven by bilateral exchanges.1 Admittedly and regrettably, these
many advantages are not for free: they obtain here because utility is transferable.
Section 2 sets the stage for cooperative risk sharing, addressed in Section 3. Ap-
propriate sharing could come via a speciﬁc, price-generated core solution, as described
in Section 4. Existence of such solutions - and possible uniqueness - is the concern of
Section 5. Section 6 specializes to cases in which the parties agree on probabilities.
Sections 7, 8 model repeated exchanges of risks, and Section 9 concludes.
Notations are as follows. Given a nonempty set S and a vector space V ,l e tV S
denote the family of all functions from S into V. For convenience, all vector spaces
considered here below are ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean. If C ⊂ V is nonempty closed
convex, and v ∈ V, the orthogonal projection PCv denotes the point in C closest to v.
Let the player set I have ﬁnite cardinality denoted |I|.W h e n(vi) ∈ V I,i ti so f t e n
convenient to write   v in lieu of (vi) and let vI :=
P
i∈I vi. The dual space V ∗ com-
prises all continuous linear functions v∗ : V → R. A function f : V → R∪{−∞} is
called proper if domf := {v ∈ V : f(v) > −∞} is nonempty. Such a function admits
a conjugate f∗ : V ∗ → R∪{+∞} deﬁned by f∗(v∗): =s u p{f(v) − v∗(v):v ∈ V }.2
2. The Setting
This section assembles pieces and parcels of the situation under scrutiny.
A stochastic, two-period economy is considered. Assets are traded right
now, under uncertainty, and they yield returns next period. Ex ante, traders cannot
precisely predict what state s ∈ S will materialize next period. Ex post they all agree
1Bilateral transactions could proceed by means of predesigned contracts, such instruments then
being insurance treaties.
2Replacing f by −f and v∗ by −v∗ gives the standard Fenchel conjugate [32]. Any proper, upper
semicontinuous, concave f is recovered via f(v)=i n f{f∗(v∗)+v∗(v):v∗ ∈ V ∗}.Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 3
on which state has happened. The state space S is an exhaustive, yet minimal list
of mutually exclusive, economically relevant scenarios. For simplicity, take S to be
ﬁnite.3
Players constitute a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set I.A g e n ti ∈ I already owns a risk ¯ yi =( ¯ yi
s)
belonging to a linear subspace Y of Y := ES. The component ¯ yi
s of his endowment is
a commodity bundle in a ﬁnite-dimensional real Euclidean space E.T h a tc o m p o n e n t
denotes his claim, indemnity or gross dividend in state s.4 For reasons explained
later, the players must contend with choices in Y ⊂ Y. By way of example, while Y
comprises all possible risks, Y could be spanned by the prescribed risks ¯ yi,i∈ I.5
Preferences are represented by payoﬀ functions πi : Y → R∪{−∞}, satisfying
πi(¯ yi) > −∞. The objective πi(·) of player i might already be a reduced function.
For example, if prior to asset trading, he must choose xi from some decision set Xi,
with objective Πi : Xi → R and subject to ci(xi) ≥ yi ∈ Y,t h e np o s i t
π
i(y











Format (1) brings out two features. First, by tacit convention, πi(yi)=−∞ iﬀ
{xi ∈ Xi : ci(xi) ≥ yi} is empty. More generally, the extreme value −∞ serves to
signal infeasibility. It accounts for restrictions and saves us explicit, repeated mention
of these if any. Second, one cannot straightforwardly presume that payoﬀ (1) be
diﬀerentiable. Therefore, throughout the paper non-smooth payoﬀsa r et o l e r a t e d .
Transferable utility is presumed. In speaking rather of payoﬀ,t h a te n t i t yi s
tacitly seen as cardinal, divisible, and transferable among agents. This assumption
may be justiﬁed in two settings. For one, agent i could be a producer who obtains
monetary revenues πi(yi) from factor proﬁle yi ∈ Y. Alternatively, he might be
a consumer who derives quasi-linear utility πi(yi)=yi
0 + πi
−0(yi
−0) from a proﬁle
yi =( yi
0,yi
−0) that has the amount yi
0 ∈ R of ”money” in some designated 0-th
coordinate. The residual function πi
−0(·) then reports the reservation price πi
−0(yi
−0)
that i would assign to the accompanying commodity bundle yi
−0.
3. Cooperative Risk Sharing
Any coalition or consortium C ⊆ I of agents could aggregate their risks into ¯ yC := P
i∈C ¯ yi and thereafter make transfers among themselves.6 Motivation for such an
3The subsequent arguments can accommodate an inﬁnite measure space S together with the
Hilbert space Y = L2(S,E) of square-integrable proﬁles s 7→ ys ∈ E, mapping S into a Euclidean
space E.
4That state-contingent claim could quite simply come as a ﬁnancial credit or debit. Then E = R.
Alternatively, if real assets generate various goods, mentioned on a ﬁnite list G,t h e nE = R
G.M o r e
generally, any topological vector space E is applicable provided it be locally convex and Hausdorﬀ.
One can construe ¯ yi as a consumption proﬁle to which agent i is entitled. This viewpoint ﬁts to
ﬁnance, and it opens up for inclusion of many time periods.
5In general, one would require that Y be closed and complementable [25]. Given our ﬁnite-
dimensional setting, Y is automatically so. The particular instance Y = Y is referred to as complete.
6Nothing precludes that i ∈ I already is a syndicate [36] or cartel, formed by agents of the same
type. For such formation see [21] and [22].Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 4
enterprise might stem from C contemplating potential payoﬀ
π
C(¯ y















Plainly, πC(¯ yC) ≥
P
i∈C πi(¯ yi) > −∞. Ab l i s sv a l u eπC(¯ yC)=+ ∞ makes no sense.
So, assume πC(¯ yC) ﬁnite for all C ⊆ I. In particular, agent i obtains ”autarky
payoﬀ” π{i}(¯ y{i})=πi(¯ yi) if he opts to avoid exchanges.
(2) is called a sup-convolution. It models pooling and friction-free redistribution
of perfectly divisible risks.7 Clearly, incentives for redistribution stem from comple-
mentarities or substitutions in the usage of technologies and endowments.
To incite everybody to join the grand coalition C = I, payoﬀsm u s tb es h a r e d
somehow. And sharing, for its viability, had better be eﬃcient, incentive compatible,
and ”equitable”. Any core imputation ﬁlls the bill. That solution concept, most pop-
ular in cooperative game theory, amounts here to specify a monetary compensation
schedule which supports Pareto eﬃciency and no blocking:
Deﬁnition 1. (Core solutions) Ap r o ﬁle c =( ci) ∈ RI of side payments belongs
to the core iﬀ it entails
Pareto eﬃciency:
P
i∈I ci = πI(¯ yI) and
no blocking:
P
i∈C ci ≥ πC(¯ yC) ∀C ⊂ I.
¾
(3)
Pareto eﬃciency requires that total payoﬀ be maximal and fully shared. No blocking
means that each coalition receives, in sum, at least as much as when going alone. Is
s u c has c h e m eo fs i d ep a y m e n t sa v a i l a b l e ? 8 More precisely: can a core solution be
exhibited, computed, interpreted and implemented? Yes, as seen next, if agents are
risk averse, indeed it can!
4. Price-generated Core Solution
The subsequent arguments for viable collaboration proceed in terms of ”price regimes”
and standard Lagrangians. To introduce and conveniently handle these objects, equip
the risk space Y = ES with a ﬁxed inner product denoted by juxtaposition y∗y.
Modulo that product, Y permits a decomposition Y ⊕ N into the direct sum of two
orthogonal spaces, N being the normal complement to the given closed subspace Y.
This means that any y ∈ Y c o m e sa sau n i q u es u my = y + n with y ∈ Y,n ∈ N,
and yn =0 .
7For indivisible goods g ∈ G, see [34] and references therein. Then, if all risks come in integer
amounts, one would use commodity space E = ZG where Z := {0,±1,±2,...}. Applying the discrete
convex analysis - and notably the Fenchel-type duality theorem 5.2 in [28] - and presuming all payoﬀ
functions πi : Y = ZG×S → R∪{−∞} M-concave, it holds an analog of Theorem 1 below.
8It is known from [33] that concave payoﬀs πi and ﬁnite values πC(¯ yC) suﬃce for the core to
be nonempty. A fortiori, the game having characteristic function S ⊇ C 7→ πC(¯ yC) ∈ R then
becomes totally balanced. More is demanded here though: Some ”speciﬁc” core element should
”constructively” be brought to the fore; mere existence is not quite satisfactory.Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 5
Correspondingly, decompose the dual space Y∗, which comprises all continuous
linear functionals on y∗ : Y→ R, into the direct sum Y ∗ ⊕ N∗ of Y ∗ := N⊥ and
N∗ := Y ⊥; see [25]. Then, any y∗ ∈ Y∗ equals a unique sum y∗ = y∗ + n∗ with
y∗ ∈ Y ∗,n ∗ ∈ N∗, and consequently, when y = y+n, we get y∗y =( y∗+n∗)(y+n)=
y∗y + n∗n.
Each payoﬀ function πi : Y → R∪{−∞} has a conjugate πi∗ : Y∗ → R∪{+∞}.
The latter, which records economic rent or consumer surplus, is deﬁned by
π
i∗(y




∗y : y ∈ Y
ª
. (4)
The function y∗ 7→ πi∗(y∗) so constructed is lower semicontinuous and convex. For
interpretation, regard i as a producer who pays y∗y f o rf a c t o ri n p u ty,g e t sp a y o ﬀ
πi(y), and collects proﬁt πi∗(y∗). After these preparations associate the standard
Lagrangian
L















to problem (2). Here the grand vector − → y := (yi) has components yi = yi + ni ∈
Y, called primal variables, construed as inputs or consumption bundles. Similarly,
− → y ∗ := (yi∗) has components yi∗ = y∗+ni∗ ∈ Y∗, called dual variables, seen as prices.
As expected from a Lagrangian, sup− → y inf− → y ∗ LC(− → y ,− → y ∗)=πC(¯ yC).
Problem (2) motivates formula (5) as follows: First, relax the balance requirement P
i∈C yi =¯ yC of coalition C by paying
P
i∈C y∗(yi − ¯ yi) for a deviation yC − ¯ yC.
Second, relax the restriction yi ∈ Y by paying ni∗ni for a normal component ni ∈ N.















Deﬁnition 2. (Shadow prices) − → y ∗ := (yi∗), with yi∗ = y∗ + ni∗ ∈ Y∗, is declared a


























always is nonnegative, a shadow price − → y ∗ := (yi∗)=( y∗ + ni∗) prevails iﬀ the said
gap is nil.
Theorem 1. (Shadow prices on risks generate core solutions) For any shadow price
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belongs to the core. That is, it satisﬁes (3).












− → y ∗ sup
− → y
L




− → y ∗ L





Thus, invoking deﬁnition (7), the ”no blocking constraints” in (3) are all easily sat-
isﬁed. Clearly, this weak duality result tells that access to a competitive market can
harm no coalition. But Pareto eﬃciency follows straightforwardly as well because,




















The left-most inequality in the last string was assumed in (6), and the extreme right
one derives for the instance C = I from (8). ¤
Theorem 1 inspires the hope that a core solution might be found - and implemented
- in terms of a linear price regime. That regime depends on the entire preference
proﬁle and the aggregate risk.
Theorem 1 also brings out that existence of equilibrium prices can be discussed
separately from that of allocations.9 Put diﬀerently: existence of price-supported core
imputations can be argued without reference to how risks are shared.
As in Negishi’s approach to competitive equilibrium, individual preferences are
aggregated into those of a single representative ﬁgure, here called the convoluted
agent. As in ﬁnance, the premium alias the price of any insurance treaty is largely
aﬀected by how its indemnity co-varies with the aggregate risk.
The competitive, decentralized nature of shadow prices regime is speaking. If
charged payment y∗(yi − ¯ yi)+ni∗ni for replacing his endowment ¯ yi +0by yi + ni,
agent i would make a choice that perfectly ﬁts problem (2) for the grand coalition
C = I. Note that formula (7) pays him in two capacities: ﬁrst, proﬁt πi∗(y∗ +ni∗) as
a ”producer” and second, reimbursement y∗¯ yi as a ”claim-holder.”
5. Existence and Uniqueness
Theorem 1 tells that a shadow price regime obtains iﬀ it realizes the saddle value
minsupLI =s u pi n fLI. Put diﬀerently: what comes to the fore is a lop-sided min-
sup result. But, as is well known, existence of saddle values cannot generally be guar-
anteed unless some compactness, continuity and convexity conditions are in vigor.
Ignoring compactness for a while, we are, as usual in microeconomics, left with con-
cerns about continuity and convexity of preferences.
9Fenchel’s duality theorem [5] facilitates that divorce. That is, dual problem attainment can
discussed separately from primal attainment.Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 7
To appreciate these properties, and to understand the nature of shadow prices,
consider a convoluted agent, who enjoys payoﬀ
π
I(y
















Two arguments aﬀect this ﬁctive fellow: ﬁrst, an aggregate risk yI ∈ Y and second,
ap r o ﬁle   n =( ni) of vectors ni ∈ N, each normal to Y . Clearly, πI(yI,  n) equals
the total payoﬀ to grand coalition I after replacing the prescribed ¯ yI by yI ∈ Y and
giving each agent i a normal component ni ∈ N. With minor abuse of notation, note
that πI(¯ yI,0) = πI(¯ yI) w h e r et h er i g h th a n dv a l u ew a sd e ﬁned already in (2). More
importantly, note that if all πi are concave, then so is πI(·,·). In other words: if all
agents are risk averse, so is the convoluted agent as well.
Returning now to the issue of compactness, if
π
I(·,·) is ﬁnite-valued in a neighborhood of (¯ y
I,0) ∈ Y × N
I, (10)
and concave, then that concern is cared for. (10) says that if local perturbations
of total endowments were possible around the reference point (¯ yI,0), the aggregate
payoﬀ to the grand coalition would remain bounded.10
(10) yields existence and a ”neoclassic”, marginalistic interpretation of shadow
prices. For the statement recall that y∗ ∈ Y∗ is called a supergradient of a proper
function f : Y→ R∪{−∞} at the point y, and we write y∗ ∈ ∂f(y), iﬀ f(y0) ≤
f(y)+y∗(y0−y) for all y0 ∈ Y.A l s or e c a l lt h a tp r o v i d e df be concave and bounded
below near y, then its superdiﬀerential ∂f(y) is nonempty; see [24], [32]. In essence,
that fact implies:
Theorem 2. (Existence and characterization of shadow price regimes)
• Suppose the function πI(·,·) is concave. Then, under qualiﬁcation (10) there ex-
ists a supergradient (y∗,  n∗) ∈ ∂πI(¯ yI,0), and it constitutes a shadow price regime
− → y =( yi∗) with yi∗ = y∗ + ni∗.
• Conversely, any such shadow price regime generates a supergradient (y∗,  n∗) ∈
∂πI(¯ yI,0).
• In sum, a shadow price regime, a n dac o r r e s p o n d i n gc o r es o l u t i o n(7), can be deﬁned
iﬀ πI(·,·) is superdiﬀerentiable at (¯ yI,0).
• If − → y ∗ =( yi∗) with yi∗ = y∗ + ni∗ is a shadow price regime, and − → y =( yi) solves






10(10) ensures that the pricing problem becomes inf-compact whence has a solution. Thus, while
agents’ choice sets may be unbounded - as in [19], [17], [27] and [31] - (10) eliminates problems
caused by long or short positions.Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 8
Proof. As pointed out already, under qualiﬁcation (10) the concave function πI(·,·),







I) −  n
∗  n ≤ π
I(¯ y
I,0) for all (y
I,  n) ∈ Y × N
I.















I,0) for all (y
i,n
i) ∈ Y × N. (12)
This, in turn, amounts to have (6). Finally, for any dual optimal (y∗,  n∗), take, on
the left hand side of (12), the (partial) superdiﬀerential with respect to yi = yi + ni
at any primal optimal yi. This yields (11). ¤
Concavity alias risk aversion played a crucial role in Theorem 2. To reduce that
role to a minimum consider the smallest concave function ˆ πI(·,·) ≥ πI(·,·). In tems
of ˆ πI two weaker hypotheses suﬃce for existence of a shadow price: ﬁrst, ˆ πI(·,·)
should be superdiﬀerentiable at (¯ yI,0); second, one should have ˆ πI(¯ yI,0) = πI(¯ yI,0).
Thus risk aversion is really not needed, neither in small nor in large. Rather, what
imports is concavity in the aggregate - and only with respect to the reference point
(¯ yI,0).
Inclusions (11) tell that all agents use the same y∗ ∈ Y ∗ to price choices within
the ”market space” Y.11 That is, up to idiosyncratic normal components ni∗,i∈ I,
the players agree on one price in Y .I n t h e market game [33] restricted to Y, any
feasible exchange deemed desirable and aﬀordable, will be made. The valuations of an
infeasible y ∈ YÂY, one whose normal component n does not vanish, will probably
vary across agents.
If potential exchanges constitute a complete space, that is, if Y = Y, then
clearly, all ni∗ =0 , and things become simpler. In that instance y∗ is brieﬂyn a m e d
a shadow price, and it holds:
Corollary. (Shadow prices under completeness) Suppose Y = Y.
• If the function πI(·) deﬁned in (2) is ﬁnite-valued in a neighborhood of ¯ yI and
concave, then it is superdiﬀerentiable at ¯ yI, and any supergradient y∗ ∈ ∂πI(¯ yI) con-
stitutes a shadow price with all ni∗ =0 .
• Conversely, any shadow price y∗ of that sort must satisfy y∗ ∈ ∂πI(¯ yI).
• In sum, a shadow price y∗ - and a corresponding core solution (7) -c a nb ed e ﬁned
with all ni∗ =0iﬀ πI(·) is superdiﬀerentiable at ¯ yI.






11Smooth versions of (11) are prominent in models of incomplete ﬁnancial markets; see [26].Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 9
When merely one good comes into consideration, that is, when E = R, Wilson [36]
lists several explicit solutions.
An extremal convolution like (2) has regularizing eﬀects [7], [14]. In particular,
this bears on possible uniqueness of shadow prices as stated next.
Proposition 1. (Unique shadow price) Suppose the space is complete, payoﬀs πi(·)
are concave, and the optimal value πI(¯ yI) is attained. Then, if at least one player
i has πi(·) strictly concave and diﬀerentiable, the convoluted payoﬀ function πI(·)
becomes diﬀerentiable at ¯ yI, and the shadow price is unique.
Proof. The distinguished agent i has a unique yi at which optimum is attained.
B yt h el a s tb u l l e th e r ea b o v ey∗ = ∇πi(yi). ¤
It is often natural to assume πI monotone increasing in each component of yI.T h e n
y∗ ≥ 0. For illustration of Theorems 1 &2, and to expand instance (1), suppose
π
i(y









featuring a bivariate proper, concave function Πi(·,·) deﬁn e do v e raE u c l i d e a nv e c t o r
space Xi×Y. Instance (1) obtains by setting Πi(xi,yi): =Πi(xi) when ci(xi) ≥ yi,
and −∞ otherwise. Coalition C could then achieve
π
C(¯ y


















Let here LC :=
P































Verbatim imitation of the proof of Theorem 1 yields:
Proposition 2. (Core solutions in terms of primitive payoﬀ functions) Given re-













for some price regime − → y ∗ =( yi∗) with yi∗ = y∗ + ni∗.T h e n , b y o ﬀering agent i
compensation ci := Πi∗(0,y ∗ + ni∗)+y∗¯ yi, we get a core solution. ¤
While Theorem 2 addresses existence of shadow prices, separate arguments are re-
quired for the availability of equilibrium allocations. Proposition 4 in [12] yields:Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 10
Proposition 3. (Existence of equilibrium allocations) Suppose the constrained,
upper-level set
(














for every compact K ⊂ Y and every real r. Then πI becomes upper semicontinu-
ous proper, and the value πI(¯ yI) will be attained by some feasible allocation (yi).I f
moreover, each πi is lower semicontinuous at the corresponding yi, then πI becomes
continuous at ¯ yI. ¤
The hypotheses in Proposition 3 serve to compactify the attractive part of the aggre-
gate decision set. A similar proposition allows relaxed proﬁles − → y =( yi) ∈ YI. The
continuity of πI at ¯ yI ensures its superdiﬀerentiability at that point. Thus (14) re-
lates to (10). Broadly, the feasible allocations that provide suﬃcient aggregate payoﬀ,
must be bounded.
6. Common Predictions and Separable Preferences
Assume henceforth that everybody holds the same opinion about the likelihood of
various outcomes.12 Formally, there is a common strictly positive probability distri-
bution p =( ps) over S. Each linear functional y∗ on Y can now be represented in





s,y s ∈ E. Such representation is particularly useful for the important instance















then equals the expected value of its ex post state-dependent counterpart, and (11)




s) for each s. Given separable format (15), if the
members of coalition C pool their claims ex post, after s has been unveiled, having




s, it might, in that circumstance, ”shoot

























Thus, one may speak about contingent, state-dependent cooperation, implemented
after s has become manifest. Like before, a compensation scheme cs =( ci
s) ∈ RI
12Admittedly, it is somewhat unsatisfactory that information is presumed symmetric. As known
from [37], [23] and other studies, asymmetries can eliminate good opportunities for mutual insurance.
Also, communication raises the prospect of additional elimination.Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 11












s ) ∀C ⊂ I.
Also, like before, if y∗













to agent i, one obtains a core solution ex post in state s.
O p p o r t u n i s t i cb e h a v i o ro ft h i ss o r t-w h e r ea g e n t sp r e f e rt owait and see, where
diﬀerent realizations are treated apart from each other - will not generally ﬁtw i t h( 3 ) .
The simple reason is, of course, that in passing from (3) to (16) all constraints yi ∈ Y
were dropped or ignored. When relieved of his constraint, agent i receives expected
compensation ¯ ci :=
P
s∈S psci
s. To emphasize the role of Y in (2) let πI(¯ yI,Y) denote













If Y ( Y, the last inequality tends to be strict. Equality holds however, under com-
pleteness:
Theorem 3. (Completeness of the market and time consistency of cooperation)
Suppose claims can be traded in a complete space; that is, suppose Y = Y. Then any
shadow price y∗ =( y∗
s) supports an over-all ex ante core solution ci := πi∗(y∗)+y∗¯ yi





s in each state s. It
holds that ci =
P
s∈S psci
s. And it does not matter whether these cooperative treaties
were written before or after the state has been unveiled. ¤
Under completeness and separable preferences (15), if for each state s the convo-
luted payoﬀ πI
s(·), as deﬁned in (16), is diﬀerentiable at ¯ yI
s, then the price (insurance
premium) of y equals ∇πI
s(¯ yI





It appears that some diversity in probability assessments may be accommodated.





s and proceed with the same analysis as here above. In other
words, the assessments could all be absolutely continuous with respect to a common
probability measure (ps).
7. Bilateral Exchange of Risks
Construction (2) invites some pressing questions. Namely, when C = I, who un-
dertakes the optimization and how? Further, since an eﬃcient solution seemingly
requires revelation of true preferences, can it be implemented? May parties fall vic-
tim to strategic communication?Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 12
To separate these issues consider ﬁrst how a center or consultant, who holds
all necessary information, might take up the computational task. For that purpose
suppose problem (2) admits an optimal solution when C = I. Also, for simplicity,
suppose hereafter that each payoﬀ function πi be ﬁnite-valued and concave across
the entire space Y.13 Thus, there are no implicit restrictions besides the explicit
constraint yi ∈ Y. Moreover, again for simplicity, suppose all superdiﬀerentials ∂πiare
uniformly bounded.14 Let {γk} be a numerical sequence of so-called step sizes, selected




γk =+ ∞, and γk → 0. (17)
The computing center, or the said consultant, could proceed by iterated gradient
projection, described as follows:
• Start at stage k := 0 with step size γ := γ0 and choices yi ∈ Y,i ∈ I, determined
by history, guesswork or accident. It should hold though, that
P
i∈I yi =¯ yI.
• Select for each agent i a marginal payoﬀ vector Mi ∈ ∂πi(yi) ⊂ Y. Project these
onto the subspace Y to have mi := PYMi with mean ¯ m :=
P
i∈I mi/|I|.




i − ¯ m) for all i. (18)
• Move to the next stage k ← k +1with new step size γ ← γk.
• Continue to Select until convergence. ¤
Proposition 4. (Coordinated convergence to the core) The described procedure
of iterated gradient projection converges to an optimal solution of problem (2) for the
grand coalition. Moreover, such a solution generates a shadow price regime.
Proof. First, consider the problem to ﬁnd the best approximate of any given vector
(ˆ y
i)= ( ˆ yi +ˆ ni) ∈ YI in the aﬃne subspace Y :=
©
(yi) ∈ Y I :
P
i∈I yi =¯ yIª
. For-
mally, this amounts to minimize
P
i∈I kyi − ˆ yik
2 s.t.
P
i∈I yi =¯ yI and all yi ∈ Y.
Since kyi − ˆ yik
2 = kyi − ˆ yik
2 + kˆ nik
2 , one gets yi =ˆ yi +(¯ yI − ˆ yI)/|I|.
Given now yi ∈ Y for all i ∈ I, and also
P
i∈I yi =¯ yI, when taking the projection
PY of the grand vector − → y +γ
− →
M:=[ yi + γMi]i∈I ∈ YI onto Y, we get, by the above
observation, as closest approximation the point [yi + γ(mi − ¯ m)]i∈I . Thus, iteration
13When πi is bounded above, this holds if πi is replaced by
ˆ πi(y): =s u p
©
πi(y0) − Ci(y − y0):y0 ∈ Y
ª
,
using a function Ci : Y 7→ R+ which is convex and vanishes only at the origin. In particular, when
Ci = k·k
2 , the so regularized function ˆ πi becomes smooth as well; see [7] Thm. 5.1.
14This holds if there exist r,ρ > 0 and an optimal solution (ˆ yi) to (2) with C = I, such that P
i∈I




πi(ˆ yi) − πi(yi)
ª
≥ ρ. In particular, some degree of strong con-
cavity in all objectives would suﬃce.Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 13
(18) is nothing else than the method of (super-)gradient projection
− → y ← PY
h




applied to problem (2) with C = I. Because that problem is concave, and because
by assumption it admits an optimal solution, convergence follows from received the-
ory; see [10]. After convergence to an optimal proﬁle − → y =( yi),p i c kac o m m o n
y∗ ∈∩ i∈IPY [∂πi(yi)], and for each agent i, an o r m a lni∗ ∈ ∂πi(yi) − y∗. Then (11)
holds. In particular, if each payoﬀ πi(·) is diﬀerentiable in classical Gâteaux sense at
yi, it holds that y∗ = PY [∂πi(yi)] and ni∗ = ∂πi(yi) − y∗. ¤
V. Pareto regarded economic markets as decentralized computing machines. Sub-
scribing here to his view, the centralized algorithm, just described, had better be
replaced by a non-coordinated process driven by the agents themselves. The one
proposed next is of that preferred sort. It purports to reﬂect repeated bilateral
exchanges of risk, proceeding as follows:
• Start at stage k := 0 with step size γ := γ0 and choices yi ∈ Y,i ∈ I, deter-
mined by history or accident such that
P
i∈I yi =¯ yI.
• Choose two agents i,i
0 ∈ I independently of past choices and according to a uniform
probability. Pick mi ∈ PY∂πi(yi), mi0 ∈ PY∂πi0(yi0).














• Move to the next stage k ← k +1with new step size γ ← γk.
• Continue to Choose two agents until convergence. ¤
Theorem 4. (Convergence of decentralized, bilateral exchanges) Suppose repeated




k < +∞. T h e nt h es e q u e n c eo f yi converges to an optimal
solution of problem (2) for the grand coalition. Moreover, such a solution generates
a shadow price regime.
Proof. If merely two agents are around, the setting is quite as in Proposition 4.
So, with no loss of generality, posit I = {1,...,|I|} with |I| > 2. Let the random
event space Ω consist of all ordered pairs (i,i0) ∈ I × I.O u t c o m eω =( i,i0) means
that players i,i
0 ∈ I are sampled (with replacement) and oﬀered the opportunity to
trade risks between themselves. Quite naturally, such opportunities should emerge
in egalitarian manner. Accordingly, endow Ω with the uniform probability measure;
that is, each ω is selected with probability 1/|I|
2 .
Take expectation with respect to ω in yi+γ(mi−mi0) to get yi+γ(mi− ¯ m)/|I|.
Thus, in expectation (19) amounts to a scaled down version of (18). Since the latterPooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 14
converges, so does the bilateral process by Prop. 2.1 in [3]. ¤
It deserves emphasis that players may very well be scantly informed. Trade can,
in principle, be postponed until shadow prices prevail. If so, processes (18) and (19)
both follow the long tradition of Walrasian tâtonnement [11], [29]. They diﬀer how-
ever, from most received versions - and from Wilson’s budgetary adjustment [35] -
in dispensing with explicit listing of prices. For greater realism transactions may
happen in the interim. Then, some trades, made before prices settle at equilibrium
levels, may be regretted by some party later on. Other trades may have turned out
favorable when viewed in hindsight.
8. Trade of Insurance Treaties
It is time at last, to justify why only risks residing in a subspace Y ⊂ Y are traded.
Clearly, if any exchange in Y were possible, the setting would be that of a barter
economy.
For a realistic optic, one that ﬁts insurance and ﬁnance, suppose exchange is me-
diated only via a ﬁnite set J of so-called instruments, brieﬂy referred to as insurance
treaties.E a c hj ∈ J is a contract that promises to pay its holder a speciﬁed indem-
nity, coverage or gross dividend dsj ∈ E if state s ∈ S comes about. Suppose treaties
are perfectly divisible and traded without quantity restrictions and transaction costs.
As before, there are only two time periods: now and later. This means that all
treaties expire after one appropriately deﬁned time-step. By a portfolio is under-
stood a vector x =( xj) ∈ X := RJ, saying precisely how much is held of various
policies/contracts. Note that portfolio x yields indemnity ys =
P
j∈J dsjxj in state
s. So, letting D =[ dsj] denote the S × J indemnity (dividend) matrix, portfolio x
entitles its holder to the proﬁle y = Dx.
Correspondingly, let Y := ImD := DX := {Dx : x ∈ X} be the image space of
D, spanned by its columns d·j ∈ Y,j∈ J. The possibly strict subspace Y ⊂ Y = ES
consists of marketable indemnity proﬁles. Vectors in YÂY cannot be synthesized
via the given instruments; they are not ”in the market.” A proﬁle y ∈ Y will be
realized by any portfolio x ∈ X which solves Dx = y. At least one such x exists by
the deﬁnition of Y . Uniqueness of x follows iﬀ D : X → Y is one-to-one. In that
case |J| = rank(D)=d i mY .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w h e nY = ES, t h e r em u s tb ea sm a n y
treaties as there are states.
At the outset agent i holds portfolio ¯ xi, generating risk ¯ yi := D¯ xi. Coalition C,
holding the aggregate ¯ xC :=
P
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This instance ﬁts Proposition 3. Note that unlimited shortselling is allowed. Oth-
erwise appropriate constraints xi ∈ Xi ⊂ X would be imposed. The transpose
matrix D∗ transports risk prices y∗ ∈ Y∗ back to prices x∗ = D∗y∗ on underlying




sdsj. Accordingly, posit ˆ πi(x): =πi(Dx) to have
ˆ πi∗(D∗y∗)=πi∗(y∗). Because D∗y∗ =0if y∗ ∈ (ImD)⊥ = Y ⊥ = N∗, we get
Proposition 5. (Shadow prices on treaties generate core solutions) For any ini-
tal holding proﬁle (¯ xi) and associated shadow price regime − → y ∗ =( yi∗)=( y∗ + ni∗)
on risks, there is a corresponding price regime x∗ := D∗yi∗ = Dy∗ on portfolios such


















belongs to the core. That is, it satisﬁes (3). ¤
Clearly, i could have access to a particular set Ji of treaties, deﬁned by an S×Ji ma-
trix Di. If so, (20) would remain a core solution with Di instead of D. Agent i might
also have handy a technology by which his eﬀort ei produces a proﬁle Ei(ei) ∈ Y.



























When however, only agent i knows ei or Ei(·), there may be problems with hidden
actions or types, these making the prospects for eﬃcient cooperation appear less
good.15
This section ends by considering repeated bilateral exchanges of portfolios.
It could go as follows:
• Start at stage k := 0 with step size γ := γ0 and choices xi ∈ X,i ∈ I, deter-
mined by history or accident.
• Choose two agents i,i0 according to the uniform distribution (i.e. in equiprobable
manner).
• Select marginal payoﬀs mi ∈ ∂πi(Dxi), mi0 ∈ ∂πi0(Dxi0) and let xi∗ = D∗mi,
xi0∗ = D∗mi0.
















• Move to next stage k ← k +1with new step size γ ← γk.
• Continue to Choose two agents until convergence. ¤
15Studies dealing with core solutions under asymmetric information include [8], [9], [23] and [37].Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks 16
Like Theorem 3 one proves:
Theorem 5. Under the assumption of Theorem 4 repeated bilateral exchanges of
portfolios lead to an optimal solution of problem (2) for the grand coalition. ¤
9. Concluding Remarks
Cooperation, exchange and trade often appear as cousins in economics. Here, given
symmetric information and wide-spread risk aversion, or at least risk neutrality, the
cooperative incentives become so strong and well distributed that the grand coalition
can safely form. Its formation means that all risks are pooled and that beneﬁts be
shared in ways not blocked by any subgroup. However, when preferences are not
convex, the price-based compensation scheme (7) is likely to reside out-of-core; see
[12], [14]. It appears though, that if all risk holders were negligible, then convexity
could be dispensed with; see [1], [38].
It seems worthwhile to allow more time periods and explore problems related to
time-consistency. Then, for properties of the characteristic function and the core, see
[18].
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